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RANAE NICOL,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,
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and WELLS FARGO BANK,
Respondent.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE BOARD'S CONTENTION THAT THE CLAIMANT "FAILED
TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS [SIC] APPEAL"
IS WITHOUT MERIT.

In it's Brief, the Board argues that this court should reject the Claimant's appeal
because Ms. Nicol failed to marshal evidence in support of the Board's decision, and cites
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

several cases which it argues support this proposition. However, the cases cited by the
Board do not apply to the Claimant in the case at bar, as she is not challenging the
findings of facts in this case. All of the cases cited by the Board regarding Claimant's
duty and failure to marshal the evidence involve challenges to findings of fact.
For example, in the case of Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the court refused to entertain factual challenges by Appellant due to a failure to
marshal evidence. However, unlike the appellant in the Crockett case, the Claimant in this
matter is not challenging findings of fact; it is the application of undisputed facts to the
law that the Claimant is arguing. Indeed, Claimant begins her "Statement of the Facts" in
the opening Brief with a statement that she does not dispute the Administrative Law
Judge's findings of fact.
The Board's reliance on Oneida/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is similarly misplaced. The portion of the
decision quoted by the Board in its' brief follows:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042.
(Italics added). This case also addressed challenges to factual findings, and is
inapplicable to this case.
The case of Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Commission, 191 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Utah
App. 2008), in rejecting the argument that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence
noted:
2
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While it is true that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence, the facts are,
for the most part, undisputed. Further, Utah Auto is not challenging the
evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom. Thus, Utah Auto need not marshal.
As in Utah Auto, the Claimant in this matter is arguing that the agency failed to properly
apply the law to the particular facts of this case.
This Court should determine that as Claimant stipulated to the facts as found by
the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board, she had no duty to marshal the evidence, and
should accordingly address the merits of this appeal.
POINT II

THE BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIMANT
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE, AS THE ELEMENT
OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.

The Board argues that the employer established that the Claimant was discharged
for just cause pursuant to R994-405-202, Utah R. Admin. R In order to establish just
cause for a discharge, the three elements of culpability, knowledge, and control must all
be established. Claimant asserts that the Board erred in discharging her, as the element of
culpability was not established. Claimant relies on the case of Gibson v. Department of
Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, (UT App 1992), wherein the court noted that the
"regulations defining culpability require a balancing of the employee's past work record,
the employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be
repeated, against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer. Id. at 784.
The Respondent argues in its brief the Board "correctly balanced the factors in
this case and determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the
3
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Employer's legitimate interests such that it necessitated her immediate discharge."
(Respondent Brief, p. 8). The brief points to no evidence in the record or the decision to
support the assertion that the Board "correctly balanced the factors in this case," and
indeed there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that the Board even
considered the factors.
With regard to the Claimant's past work record, the length of her employment, and
the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated, these factors are not even mentioned in
the decision. The claim that the Board considered these factors, and after considering
them determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the
Employer's legitimate interest such that it necessitated her immediate discharge, is not
supported by the decision. The decision makes no reference to these factors, or to any
other balancing of factors. The decision notes that "the Employer considers compliance
with the policy to be such a serious matter that it discharges employees for a single
violation of the policy." R. @ 62.
In the case at bar, there was no actual harm to the employer. Rule 994-405-202
(1), states that the conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. The Board
asserts that the culpability standard does not require actual harm to the employer, only
potential harm. Fieeiki v. Dept of Workforce Services, 122 P.3d 706 (Utah App 2005).
However, the Fieeiki case is distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Fieeiki, the Claimant was a law enforcement officer, and had a charge of
4
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domestic violence substantiated against him. Further, the court noted in the decision the
officer was not only substantiated for domestic violence, but that had been charged with a
violent crime. Id. at 709. The conduct of the officer in the Fieeiki case resulted with him
being charged with a crime. Accordingly, the conduct is much more serious than the
Claimant's single incident of reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son.
Her testimony about the fees for the account being erroneously applied is uncontested.
When the Claimant found the misapplied charges, she did go to the supervisor for
guidance about the fees. R. at 35. When she brought the matter to the attention of the
supervisor and asked whether she could reverse the charges, she was given the curious
response to "do it at her own risk." R. at 35-36. She reversed the misapplied charges,
and was terminated five weeks later.
In arguing that the Claimant's conduct was so serious that discharge from her
employment was necessary to avoid potential harm, the Respondent asserts that she
"engaged in a dishonest, volitional act." (Respondent's Brief, p 9). There is no support
for this characterization of the Claimant's conduct in reversing the fees. Had the conduct
been "dishonest", would the Claimant bring the conduct to the attention of her
supervisor? There is no mention in the decision of the Board, nor so much as a claim by
the employer of any "dishonest" act by the Claimant. Indeed, in the Claim Report to the
Department of Workforce Services regarding the discharge of the Claimant, the employer
does not even answer the question regarding how the employer was harmed by the
Claimant's actions. The space on the form is left blank. {See Exhibit 9, R. @ 009).
5
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The factors for determining culpability pursuant to 11-994-405-202(1), Utah R.
Admin. P. were not properly applied in the Claimant's case. The decision of the ALJ and
of the Board did not balance the claimant's single, isolated incident of violating a
company policy, against the interests of the employer. The Board concluded that because
the employer considers violation of the policy to be serious enough to justify terminating
the employee, the violation sufficiently jeopardized the employer's rightful interests. R.
@62.
The employer in this matter suffered no actual harm. In reviewing the elements of
culpability, this Court considers five factors relevant to the analysis: (1) whether the
employee's prior pattern of behavior was consistent with the incident of misconduct; (2)
whether the employee's actions and admission of mistake indicate that the conduct will
not reoccur; (3) the seriousness and flagrancy of the conduct; (4) the actual and potential
harm to the employer and public; and (5) length and strength of the prior work record.
The evidence is uncontested that the Claimant had no prior incidents of
misconduct at her employment. Indeed, the day she was terminated from her
employment she was awarded a 3 rd quarter standard of excellence award from her
employer reflecting a 100% customer satisfaction survey. R. @ 7. She had an error-free
work record. Claimant talked to her supervisor about the erroneous charges to the
account before she reversed the charges. When asked if she had reversed the fee, she was
honest and admitted that she had reversed it, and indicated that she had made a mistake.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated in Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of
6
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Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), that the purpose of the Employment Security Act
is "to provide a cushion for the shocks and rigors of unemployment. The Court has called
for a liberal construction of the act: "mere inefficiency or failure of good performance as
the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence, isolated instances of ordinary
negligence, or good faith errors in judgment or decisions do not constitute culpable
conduct which precludes a discharged employee from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits. Id. at 429-430.
Claimant's conduct was a violation of her employer's policy, but it was a single
incident of poor judgment. She had no intent of causing harm to her employer, and the
employer in fact was not harmed, and did not claim any potential or actual harm. She
sought the advise of a supervisor before reversing the fees, only to be given the response
to "do it at your own risk." R. at 39.
The Claimant asserts that when balanced, these factors support the conclusion that
the element of culpability has not been established. The Board's application of the law to
the facts of this case finding culpability, particularly when the act is to be liberally
construed, is not within the realm of reasonableness and rationality, and this Court should
reverse the decision of the agency.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court should consider the merits of this appeal as the facts are
uncontested and therefore Claimant had no obligation to marshal the evidence. This Court
should reverse the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board concluding that culpability
7
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had been established, and award benefits to the Claimant.
Dated this ft?
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE BOARD'S CONTENTION THAT THE CLAIMANT "FAILED
TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS [SIC] APPEAL"
IS WITHOUT MERIT.

In it's Brief, the Board argues that this court should reject the Claimant's appeal
because Ms. Nicol failed to marshal evidence in support of the Board's decision, and cites
1
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several cases which it argues support this proposition. However, the cases cited by the
Board do not apply to the Claimant in the case at bar, as she is not challenging the
findings of facts in this case. All of the cases cited by the Board regarding Claimant's
duty and failure to marshal the evidence involve challenges to findings of fact.
For example, in the case of Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the court refused to entertain factual challenges by Appellant due to a failure to
marshal evidence. However, unlike the appellant in the Crockett case, the Claimant in this
matter is not challenging findings of fact; it is the application of undisputed facts to the
law that the Claimant is arguing. Indeed, Claimant begins her "Statement of the Facts" in
the opening Brief with a statement that she does not dispute the Administrative Law
Judge's findings of fact.
The Board's reliance on Oneida/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is similarly misplaced. The portion of the
decision quoted by the Board in its' brief follows:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042.
(Italics added). This case also addressed challenges to factual findings, and is
inapplicable to this case.
The case of Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Commission, 191 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Utah
App. 2008), in rejecting the argument that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence
noted:
2
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While it is true that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence, the facts are,
for the most part, undisputed. Further, Utah Auto is not challenging the
evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom. Thus, Utah Auto need not marshal.
As in Utah Auto, the Claimant in this matter is arguing that the agency failed to properly
apply the law to the particular facts of this case.
This Court should determine that as Claimant stipulated to the facts as found by
the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board, she had no duty to marshal the evidence, and
should accordingly address the merits of this appeal.
POINT II

THE BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIMANT
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE, AS THE ELEMENT
OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.

The Board argues that the employer established that the Claimant was discharged
for just cause pursuant to R994-405-202, Utah R. Admin. P. In order to establish just
cause for a discharge, the three elements of culpability, knowledge, and control must all
be established. Claimant asserts that the Board erred in discharging her, as the element of
culpability was not established. Claimant relies on the case of Gibson v. Department of
Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, (UT App 1992), wherein the court noted that the
"regulations defining culpability require a balancing of the employee's past work record,
the employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be
repeated, against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer. Id. at 784.
The Respondent argues in its brief the Board "correctly balanced the factors in
this case and determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the
3
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Employer's legitimate interests such that it necessitated her immediate disc!large."
(Resp i. K • i:
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I or the decision to

support the assertion that the Board "correctly balanced the factors in this case," and
indeed there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that the Board even
considered the factors.
With regard t< > tl u ; Claii i lai it's past work record, the length of her employment, and
the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated, these factors are not even mentioned in
the decision. The claim that the Board considered these factors, and after considering
them determined tlui (lit »mui isness of the offense sufficiei ilh icopurdized tl ic
Employer's legitimate interest such that it necessitated her immediate discharge, is not
supported by the decision. The decision makes no reference to these factors, or to any
other balancing of factors. The decision notes that "the T •- . , ver considers compliance
with tl le polic > b 3 be • si ic 1 1 a set i< )i is i i latter that it discharges employees for a single
violation of the policy." R. @ 62.
In the case at bar, there was no actual harm to the employer. Rule 994-405-202
(1 )„ states th.

-act causii ig tl ic disci lai ge i i n isl be so serioi is that coi itii n iii lg tl le

employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. The Board
asserts that the culpability standard does not require actual harm to the employer, only
potential 1: lan i i Fieeiki v. Dept. of Workforce Services,

122 [ > 3c 1 706 (I ftal i \ pi 2005).

However, the Fieeiki case is distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Fieeiki, the Claimant was a law enforcement officer, and had a charge of
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domestic violence substantiated against him. Further, the court noted in the decision the
officer was not only substantiated for domestic violence, but that had been charged with a
violent crime. Id. at 709. The conduct of the officer in the Fieeiki case resulted with him
being charged with a crime. Accordingly, the conduct is much more serious than the
Claimant's single incident of reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son.
Her testimony about the fees for the account being erroneously applied is uncontested.
When the Claimant found the misapplied charges, she did go to the supervisor for
guidance about the fees. R. at 35. When she brought the matter to the attention of the
supervisor and asked whether she could reverse the charges, she was given the curious
response to "do it at her own risk." R. at 35-36. She reversed the misapplied charges,
and was terminated five weeks later.
In arguing that the Claimant's conduct was so serious that discharge from her
employment was necessary to avoid potential harm, the Respondent asserts that she
"engaged in a dishonest, volitional act." (Respondent's Brief, p 9). There is no support
for this characterization of the Claimant's conduct in reversing the fees. Had the conduct
been "dishonest", would the Claimant bring the conduct to the attention of her
supervisor? There is no mention in the decision of the Board, nor so much as a claim by
the employer of any "dishonest" act by the Claimant. Indeed, in the Claim Report to the
Department of Workforce Services regarding the discharge of the Claimant, the employer
does not even answer the question regarding how the employer was harmed by the
Claimant's actions. The space on the form is left blank. {See Exhibit 9, R. @ 009).
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The factors for determining culpability pursuant to R-994-4Q5-202(Th Utah R .
Admin. P. w ere i not pi operly apj )lied ii :i tl ic Ch lii t u u it's case. Tl le dec ision of the ALJ and
of the Board did not balance the claimant's single, isolated incident of violating a
company policy, against the interests of the employer. The Board concluded that because
the employer considers violation oftl ic j: >olic y tc » be serious enoi igl i. to ji istify tei it nil lating
the employee, the violation sufficiently jeopardized the employer's rightful interests. R.
@62.
The employer in this matter suffered no actual harni Iii reviewing the elements of
culpability, tl.

,

• • - lers five factors relevant to tl ic ai lalysis: (1) whetl iei: tl :te

employee's prior pattern of behavior was consistent with the incident of misconduct; (2)
whether the employee's actions and admission of mistake indicate that the conduct will
not reoccur; (3) the seriousness and flagrancy of the condi ict; ( 4) the acti lal ai id potei itial
harm to the employer and public; and (5) length and strength of the prior work record.
The evidence is uncontested that the Claimant had no prior incidents of
misconduct at her employment. Indeed, the day she was terminated from her
ei i lployi i lent she was awarded a 3rd qt i< titer slam

' >f excellence award froi it I I I sr

employer reflecting a 1 0 0 % customer satisfaction survey. R. @ 7. She had an error-free
work record. Claimant talked to her supervisor about the erroneous charges to the
accou
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honest and admitted that she had reversed it, and indicated that she had m a d e a mistake.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated in Logan Regional
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v. Board of

- :is

Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), that the purpose of the Employment Security Act
is "to provide a cushion for the shocks and rigors of unemployment. The Court has called
for a liberal construction of the act: "mere inefficiency or failure of good performance as
the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence, isolated instances of ordinary
negligence, or good faith errors in judgment or decisions do not constitute culpable
conduct which precludes a discharged employee from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits. Id at 429-430.
Claimant's conduct was a violation of her employer's policy, but it was a single
incident of poor judgment. She had no intent of causing harm to her employer, and the
employer in fact was not harmed, and did not claim any potential or actual harm. She
sought the advise of a supervisor before reversing the fees, only to be given the response
to "do it at your own risk." R. at 39.
The Claimant asserts that when balanced, these factors support the conclusion that
the element of culpability has not been established. The Board's application of the law to
the facts of this case finding culpability, particularly when the act is to be liberally
construed, is not within the realm of reasonableness and rationality, and this Court should
reverse the decision of the agency.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court should consider the merits of this appeal as the facts are
uncontested and therefore Claimant had no obligation to marshal the evidence. This Court
should reverse the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board concluding that culpability
7
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had been established, and award benefits to the Claimant.
I );ilal this / ^ ^ d a y of Noveniba 2012.
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